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Paper is drawing's and writing's shared substrate. However, the anchorage of the 
drawn mark to the sheet, its instantiation as a stroke bound to its ground, is 
considered different from the detachability of writing's inscription. This essay seeks to 
pursue the power of writing and drawing practices as indissociable from their material 
affordances. Setting out from the phrase 'this paper here' it follows a trail of 
assumptions about paper that render it impossibly blank and infinitely inscribable. 
Though not limited to either practice, medial expectations of paper already orient the 
material encounter with it by designating it beforehand as 'for' drawing or writing. 
Following Derrida's writing on the inseparability of paper from its 'acts', media-
philosophical discourses on the 'proper' relations between writing/drawing and its 
substrates are scrutinised. The essay consequently discusses the blind spots of 
drawing and writing vis-à-vis its surface and aims to articulate an approach to paper 
that accounts for the connections of its cognitive and affective power. In showing the 
intimate connections between drawing and writing acts on paper, the interrelations of 
gesture and material in any paperwork is explored. The essay ultimately emphasises 
paper’s active role in the cognitive and sensuous work of drawing and writing. 
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PAPERCHASE 
Tilo Reifenstein, York St John University 
 
If this is printed on copy paper, it will not be able to avoid talking about itself. Or again, 
if this is not printed on copy paper, it will neither be able not to itemise itself as a type 
of paper: now virtual paper, later reading paper, soon scrap paper, then waste paper 
of the future. 
 
This paper here 
Lothar Müller’s history of the age of paper (2014) forgoes any such solipsistic 
statements, never navel-gazing at its own material construction, never self-reflexively 
imagining itself to be on a different kind of paper, instead it gets on with the job of 
talking paper. Yet, how can we talk of paper through and on paper without also writing 
an autobiographic entry of these sheets (virtual or otherwise) of paper? Are there then, 
different kinds of paper being written on and about? To give any historical account of 
paper is to speak of no sheet and of all sheets. It is to speak of paper in general 
through specific papers devoid of their specificity. It is to make sense of the fact that all 
sheets of paper are unique, but only in the way that every sheet is different from any 
other, as any object is necessarily different from its own reiteration by virtue of coming 
before it without being originary. Müller’s project is therefore decidedly about the 
generality of paper through and despite of the specific. The following, on the other 
hand, is about a specificity of paper through and despite of its general notion. Of 
course, neither of these papers exist. 
 What is at stake when we talk about general or specific paper comes sharply into 
focus through paper’s usual collocation with blank. Blank paper is not only void but 
also generally blanc (white). To demand a blank sheet of paper is not to want a red 
one, however few marks it has on it (OED, 2016 s.v. blank adj./adv.). A blank sheet of 
paper somehow marks itself out as a sheet that has not been written or drawn on. It 
does not carry inscriptions. Yet it neither denotes a bedraggled piece of scrap, the torn 
edge of a piece of millboard or the verso of an envelope, however little writing or 
drawing they carry. Although blankness refers less to a lack of characteristics – it may 
be lined or chequered – its void is not just the absence of written or drawn characters. 
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary entry is illuminating in this respect. It notes that ‘blank’ 
designates ‘[w]ithout writing; unwritten; empty of all marks’ (1785, s.v. blank adj.). The 
final clause is crucial in describing the impossibility of blank paper. Given the 
necessary characteristics of paper – with lines or without, detergent white or ecru, rag 
or ground-wood, handmade or machine-made, deckled or cut-edge, long-grained or 
short-grained – the lack of marks seemingly refers to a rather arbitrary ascription, 
whether a particular type of characteristic or usage constitutes marks or not. 
Nonetheless, even the notion of prior usage is misleading here and merely the result 
of the implicit, oxymoronic phrase blank paper. Blankness describes an impossible 
ideal precisely because it evokes certain characteristics without allowing them to 
constitute (its own) demarcations of specificity. Blank paper is seemingly different from 
other paper because it is marked by certain qualities, which, however, do not mark it in 
return. All paper is prior paper. All paper has marks on it. There is no unmarked paper. 
There is no paper that does not carry the marks of itself as a singular bit of paper, with 
particular dimensions, colour, texture, tooth and so on. There is no ‘pure white paper’, 
no paper whose possibilities are entirely open, which is the proverbial blank canvas or 
tabula rasa that may be marked without restriction. Yet, in contradistinction to the 
actual use and encounter of paper, the ideal (blankness) of paper permeates our 
understanding of it. This ideal sheet, however, is not really paper as material but rather 
paper as materiality. A materiality that describes, as Tim Ingold remarked ironically, 
‘what makes things “thingly”’ (2007b, p.9). It is a kind of materiality that, unhelpfully, 
says little about materials. 
 So, what then of this paper here? What can be said of its material? What paper 
addresses you directly; wants you to know what it is? What, or which one, is this 
paper? What does it mean to read here this paper? What does it want there? Does it 
interrogate its own – this – support, rhetoric, discourse? Is this (anaphoric) it, which 
reiterates but doesn’t explain, the foregoing this paper, here? Like the store of heres, 
theres, thises and thats – the store of expressions that depend on the context of usage 
– is this paper here just a (deictic) reminder, like its it, that wants to show itself as 
cellulose surface, inky alphabetic symbols, phosphorescent (virtual) white or 
discursivity yet to come? And if every single one of these is analysed, which ones 
belong to the text. Can this paper, here, as empirical, tangible, desirable support ever 
be (endophoric,) inside the discourse, or will it forever remain outside, excluded, 
always the other, always external to the text. For if we did not print this paper, or if we 
had printed it on a different sheet, will it have been this paper, here? It will only have 
been this paper if – self-reflexively – it was never anything but its own discourse, an 
ideal discourse written onto ideal paper prior to this discourse on paper, written in a 
virtuality that submits it to any base without ever belonging to it, the transcendental 
support for a transcendental logos. Yet, it is this paper, here, which requires itself to be 
tearupable, scrunchable, deletable, overwritable, divisible to make this paper, here. 
 What is it then that is meant here by this paper? Is it the desirable physical object, 
or the rhetorical idea and ideal, wrested from the encumbrance of empirical body? Or 
is it the ideal of any backing that could be inscribed (ideally) like paper? 
 
It is to be feared (but is this a threat? isn’t it also a resource?) that these three 
‘uses’ of the noun paper, the word paper, are superimposed or overprinted on 
each other in the most equivocal way – at every moment. And thus 
overwritten on each other right from the figuration of the relation between the 
signifier and signified ‘paper.’ 
(Derrida, 2005, p.52, italics in original) 
 
 Thus, to read the words this paper, here, in reminding us of the support of these 
words, we are encountering both ideal and material. As Christina Lupton puts it, to 
write this paper here is to complicate the relationship between pointing and the thing 
(2010, p.424). Through this simple phrase, we face the ideal and the material of 
writing, and the necessary forgetting of the page and the symbol as material to which 
we subscribe in order to get on with reading: this paper here. In the double negative of 
Paul de Man ‘the definitive erasure of a forgetting that leaves no trace’ that is taking 
place in the writing of this paper here (de Man cited in Lupton, 2010, p.424; de Man, 
1986, pp.42–3), draws on the duplicity – both treacherous and doubled – of the 
material and materiality of writing. Or differently, to forget that you are reading literally, 
letter by letter, is a precondition of reading. 
 And yet it needs to be written in order for it to be writing and in order to be writing, it 
needs to exceed the singular mark, it needs to be (virtually) multiple, repeatable, 
iterable. There is then ‘the obvious opposition[…] between the singularity of writing 
acts and the reproducibility of the written’ (Lupton, 2010, p.410), a contest between 
writing here and now and the necessary repeatability that is key to language. Writing 
incorporates, in the sense that it both ‘forms’ a corpus and ‘embodies’. That is, it forms 
‘a body’ and takes on the body of another. In this double incorporation, writing is the 
mark’s body, without being limited to it, and the ideal of the mark that must be 
repeated in alterity. Similarly then for this paper here, which needs to be there for 
writing to occur, it needs to deliver up its body for writing to have a body, but it will not 
unequivocally claim to be the text’s body. Or differently, in order for this text here to 
refer exclusively to this paper here, we require a writing outside of iterable language. A 
writing that does not repeat is, however, not a legible sign at all, because it does not 
offer itself up to re-cognition in and despite of its difference from notional self-identity 
(Derrida, 2001, p.310).  
 Hegel attributes the difficulty of talking about this paper here to the divergence 
between the sensory intricacy of this particular sheet and the generality that may be 
consciously approached through language. 
 
[For instance,] they [those who speak of a reality of sensory objects] mean this 
piece of paper, on which I am writing, or better, have already written, this; but 
they do not say what they mean. If they really intend to speak of this piece of 
paper that they mean, and they do intend so, it is impossible to do so, for the 
sensory This that is meant, is unattainable by language, which belongs to 
consciousness, that is to the intrinsically universal. In the midst of their very 
attempt to say it, that This would moulder […] (Hegel, 1907, p.73, author’s 
translation) 
 
For Hegel, the attempt to claim the reality of this sheet of paper, to identify it (as itself) 
in language, is an infinite task that exceeds our capacity. Rather, the sheet of paper 
itself would alter, continue its material senescence, which would consequently 
establish a discord with any previous description of it. What may therefore be said of 
this sheet of paper is not a reality or truth but what is ‘meant’. The reference to any 
real thing or external object itself is, for Hegel, merely to describe it as universal, 
because designating a unique object – This – makes the singular itself universal by 
flattening difference – everything can be This.  
 The difference Hegel draws between the thing, its sensory perception and the 
possibility of language to account for either comes into focus in the act of pointing. As 
the hand can point to an object so can language, yet the point of touch separates how 
something is laid hold of immediately or mediately. 
 
But if I want to help out language, which possesses the divine nature of 
subverting meaning directly, transform it and thus hindering it to verbalise at 
all, by pointing this piece of paper out, I experience in this way what the truth 
of sensory certainty in fact is; I point it out as a Here, a Here of other Heres, or 
in itself a simple togetherness of many Heres, i.e. [I point it out] as a universal, 
I receive it just as it is in truth, and instead of knowing something immediate I 
perceive it. (Hegel, 1907, p.74, author’s translation and italics) 
 
Leander Scholz argues that Hegel’s choice to illustrate his point through a piece of 
paper is significant in view of the larger project of The Phenomenology of Spirit. The 
sheet of paper allows Hegel not only to move between sensory thing and medium but 
also to address the ‘transfer of subject-object relation to one between subjects’ (2013, 
p.168, author’s translation). Thus he can introduce an ontological framework in which 
things are unattainable and already medially exceeded in the processes of reading 
and writing, which makes things ‘mere signifieds of signifiers written onto an empty 
sheet’ (2013, p.169, author’s translation). In this way, the writing subject herself comes 
face to face with her own disappearance, and writing shows itself less a seamless 
transition from thought to verbal utterance than a medial challenge to the discussion of 
itself. 
 On the other hand, as Derrida may describe it, in the very act of pointing to this 
sheet here, the repeatability of the sign in its alteration – iterability – shows itself as 
structurally necessary for the possibility of pointing but also as a fortiori the 
impossibility to limit pointing to one thing (1988, p.20). Or, differently again, Jean-
François Lyotard identifies two meanings attached to the same sheet of paper as a 
sign. Building on Émile Benveniste’s (1971) and his own reading of Saussure (1966) 
he differentiates signification as a concept or meaning that is quasi-merged with the 
signifier (sound, inscriptions etc) from designation, which takes the sign as a whole to 
refer to an actual or imagined object: 
 
the Hegelian difficulty [is in] the opposition between exteriority and interiority – 
in other words, on exactly what we referred to as the two definitions of 
meaning: meaning in interiority, which is signification (Sinn); and meaning in 
exteriority, namely designation (Bedeutung). (Lyotard, 2011, p.41, italics in 
original) 
 
Neither signification, nor designation, nor their combination sufficiently wear out 
Lyotard’s meaning, rather, they introduce additional difficulty into discourse because 
the first also brings with it comparative value and the second thickness, an opacity that 
hinders clear identification and limits the perception and understanding of a sign 
(2011, pp.129, 93). And equally, neither signification, nor designation, nor their 
combination may be interrogated to absolutely exhaust the figural of writing, because 
the figure already unsettles both discourse and perception. Though the signification-
designation distinction appears useful in order to grapple with this paper here, Lyotard, 
in drawing on Gottlob Frege, is also very quick to point out that we cannot stop at 
signification alone, for we hardly refer to the ‘sense’ (Sinn) of something without also 
referring to its ‘reference’ (Bedeutung) (Lyotard, 2011, p.105; Frege, 1892, p.31). 
 The attraction of the various philosophical approaches to the relations between the 
deictic phrase and any actual paper lies not only in the richness of the complications 
they uncover at the heart of language. It is also in the shared indication that the 
difficulty to write about and describe this sheet of paper is illimitable to notions of 
polysemy in language. Instead of seeking to disentangle the divergent readings of the 
phrase – in order, perhaps, to homogenise a discourse – it is here rather important to 
note that they all question a putatively transparent communication through language 
even prior to interrogating any particular utterance. Whether in Hegel’s universalising 
language, Derrida’s illimitable context or Lyotard’s sense and reference, the notion 
that the written mark may be stabilised if only the multiplicity of its meanings could be 
arrested is displaced. Writing and the contiguity of its meaning are rather found to 
proceed hand in hand. 
 The autographic inscription of any particular sheet of paper, which displays the 
indexical trail of a gesture unless the link is digital, here merely exacerbates the 
problem by highlighting the line’s connection between verbal and pictural mark. And 
yet, the written mark may point ardently at its own physical and material constituents 
without ever belonging to them. In pointing to its substrate, it never ceases to be 
already detachable, virtually belonging to no sheet and all sheets.  
 Nevertheless, handwriting in particular has acquired connotations that strongly link 
it to its writer and the very substrate of its mark by reinscribing notions of hic et nunc 
into the process of writing as such (cf. Molchanov, 2012, pp.30–1). In this way, 
handwriting’s gesture is perceived as establishing an affective, bodily and meaningful 
relation between writer and reader of a given sheet (cf. Hensher, 2012; O’Connell, 
2012; Williams, 2012). However, as Müller points out, the notion of the handwritten 
word as coming from the inside, i.e. as having an indexical relation to the one who 
draws it, comes about in an age dominated by printed texts. He notes how the ancient 
(Western) world associated speech with the esoteric, coming from the inside, 
considering writing exoteric, coming from the outside (2014, pp. 90–1). 
 To speak therefore of this paper here, is to acknowledge that this sheet is beset 
with the multiplicity of being the thing, the name, the pointer and the pointed-at. Whilst 
we may attempt to cleave clear distinctions between discourse, substrate, ideality of 
the substrate and discourse on the (ideal) substrate – Which one? The one written 
physically/virtually onto it or the one written about it? – the layering is already 
irreversibly part of the very expression chosen. Iterability marks the very possibility of 
writing as a practice of stolen and borrowed words (Derrida, 2001, pp. 223–4). They 
arrive and are animated with the burden and pleasure of their former and coming use. 
Failing to acknowledge the pre-scriptiveness that language use brings to writing, its 
objects of reference or the mechanisms of ‘communication’ would thus be to write off 
the distinction between the description of the phenomenon and the phenomenon. 
 Writing thus partakes in a number of non-exclusive spaces that overlap each other. 
On the one hand, it is shaped by any other language use and shapes it in turn, and, 
on the other, as Boris Groys has put it (2004, p.243), it positions itself in the literary 
spaces of the discourses it partakes in. Aside from these linguistic and literary spaces 
however, writing must leave its written mark somewhere. Again, it needs to be written 
in order for it to be writing. The jostling about the spaces writing inscribes itself in 
therefore returns to the page, whether cellulosic or virtual. How does the space of 
writing’s mark engage with writing’s other spaces? The contention here is that the 
sheet of paper is never a merely acquiescent ground on which inscriptive acts are 
performed. Rather, material characteristics of paper and implement inform the 
gestures of their own inscription. This interdependency of material and gesture is not 
merely an aesthetic phenomenon that affords affective relations, but also regulates the 
cognition of both writer-drawer and reader-viewer. The sheet of paper as sensory 
space is not closed and external to its inscription.  
 
Blancness 
The idea of the suppliant surface, conceding all marks but somehow separable from 
them, is linked to a perception of writing’s substrate as an unmarked and immaculate 
territory. The notion of blank paper as a limitless resource open for conquest or 
exploitation has seemingly wide appeal, however unfaithful this supposed blankness is 
toward any actual sheet of paper. 
 
Observe the maiden, innocently sweet, 
She’s fair white paper, an unsullied sheet; 
On which the happy man, whom fate ordains, 
May write his name, and take her for his pains. 
(Franklin, 1838, p.64, italics in original) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the complex characteristics of paper are commonly explored via 
analogy, which metaphorises the experience of writing and drawing on paper through 
other observations or practices. Yet in carrying the (mis)conceptions of one thing to 
another, the metaphor also manifests particular cultural, societal and individual mores. 
Among the favoured tropes to describe paper are forms of spatial perambulation 
(exploration or construction on a surface) and linkages to the human body (touching or 
using paper like another body) (cf. Ingold, 2007a, pp.41–70, 74–103, 2011, pp.148–
64, 178, 196–208, 210–19, 2015; Kandinsky, 1926, pp.54–6; Klee, 1925, pp.6–7, 
1979, p.18; Petherbridge, 2010, p.116). In ‘Paper: a poem’ attributed to Benjamin 
Franklin from which the above stanza is taken – Müller introduces it as ‘humorous’ 
(2014, p.170) – nine different types of paper (e.g. gilt, brown, sinking, touch) are 
mapped onto characteristics of different kinds of people (e.g. fop, wretch, miser, 
squabbler). The crass sexism of the virgin sheet and the virgin body – because she is 
clearly not a person here, but something that requires d(en)omination – alone would 
merit a longer analysis, as would the implication of sullage of the non-virgin body, but 
the focus shall remain on the white sheet rather than the necessary readings this 
poem should undergo in view of a politics of the body. Franklin’s poem is interesting 
from a paper perspective, in the way that it is symptomatic for a seeming engagement 
with the material of paper without however saying much about the material at all. 
Paper is conceived as an ideality that a priori determines what it should be. 
 
Mechanics, servants, farmers, and so forth, 
Are copy paper of inferior worth; 
Less prized, more useful, for your desk decreed; 
Free to all pens, and prompt at every need. 
(Franklin, 1838, p.63, italics in original) 
 
Although copy paper is here one of Franklin’s nine different kinds of paper, it merely 
describes another impossible white paper. It is open to all marks and implements, 
though materially – not just nominally – it is quite different from the foolscap (politician) 
described elsewhere. Franklin’s, albeit farcical, description of paper classifies types 
rather than develop characteristics. 
 Naming and apparent use are more relevant for the poem’s description of paper 
than any sensory approach to the material. However, Franklin’s portrayal is not 
exceptional because our engagement with paper is already structured by a longing to 
encounter a particular kind of material, especially one that may stand in contrast to 
any actual experience of it. As Derrida describes it, we anticipate paper with a 
‘nostalgia’ that makes it ‘both sensitive and impassive, both friendly and resistant, both 
very much on its own and coupled to our bodies, not only with every mechanical 
impression, but before any impression not reproducible by my hand’ (2005, p.62). Our 
hands’ touch of paper does not arrive via impossible neutrality between subject and 
object. Rather, it is the confluence of bodies that already share an intimate history of 
caresses and blandishments. 
 
It is nostalgia for the proffered page on which a virtually inimitable handwriting 
creates a path for itself with the pen – a pen which, not so long ago, I still used 
to dip in ink at the end of a pen holder; a nostalgia for the color or weight, the 
thickness and the resistance of a sheet – its folds, the back of its recto-verso, 
the fantasies of contact, of caress, of intimacy, proximity, resistance, or 
promise: the infinite desire of the copyist, the cult of calligraphy, an ambiguous 
love for the scarcity of writing, a fascination for the word incorporated in paper. 
These are certainly fantasies. 
(Derrida, 2005, pp.62–3, italics in original) 
 
Perhaps Derrida’s characterisation appears overdrawn because not every sticky note 
is recognisable immediately for its swooning allure but the act of marking the page is 
not limited to a disinterested physical deposition of one matter on another. If this were 
the case, writing would not be readable and pictures could not be seen. Rather 
Derrida’s description of paper points towards the inseparability of paper’s 
sensocognitive appeal and the transmission of power and affection through papers. 
Though the intricately folded poulet sent between lovers, the parliamentary scroll 
determining obligations or the duplicate of the gas-repair bill are not bound to their 
singular substrate, they nonetheless partake in the economy of paper and spread not 
only their own message but also instantiate their power and affect in paper. The 
fantasies of paper, the intimacy it may offer and the power it may promise are not only 
on the paper but also part of it. The perambulatory gesture that explores paper or the 
intimacy between the nib’s tines and paper’s surface are consequently not only 
allegories of an extremely close physical scrutiny of a material but also already 
epiphenomenal to the wider effects of the uses of paper. 
 Freud’s description of writing as a forbidden sexual act may be a point in case. On 
the one hand, it metaphorises writing as the sexual conjunction of pen and paper, and, 
on the other, it cannot avoid eliciting that any actual copulation may be the result of a 
courtship by letter. 
 
As soon as writing, which entails making a liquid flow out of a tube onto a 
piece of white paper assumes the symbolic signification of coitus, or as soon 
as walking becomes a symbolic substitute for treading upon the body of 
mother earth, both writing and walking are stopped because they represent 
the performance of a forbidden sexual act. 
(1926, p.10, author’s translation) 
 
The writing analogy implicitly rehearses the shared etymology of pencil and penis but 
more importantly also represents a description of putative power relations between 
genders. Read in conjunction with the subsequent walking analogy, sex is here not 
only strictly heterosexual but also something done to a suppliant receiver. The 
comparisons drawn are precisely not reducible to close observation transferred 
between referents, rather they reiterate other conventions and cannot be limited to any 
singular context. Curiously, given the pithy nature of the description one adjective 
jumps out again. That the sheet of paper has to be ‘white’ comes as no surprise, for it 
seeks to typify the same object sought by Franklin. 
 Of the same class of typification, however in a reversal of the analogical direction, is 
also John Locke’s oft-evoked trope regarding the intellectual pliability a child’s mind 
offers to morality. ‘White paper receives any Characters’ (Locke, 1714, Bk.1, Ch.3, 
p.21) is not only interesting for what it professes to know about the human mind but 
also in its assumption about white paper. Müller, although writing about paper, is more 
fascinated with Locke’s metaphorical description of the impressionability of the mind 
and its power to capture material than with the analogical implications for the sheet of 
paper (Müller, 2014, pp.177–8; cf. Vogt, 2008, pp.61–3, 79–82). Franklin’s, Freud’s 
and Locke’s en-passant descriptions are indicative of a perception of paper that 
purportedly speaks to material experience but are incongruous with it. Of course, any 
paper has some potential to be marked, but material contingencies predominate the 
interaction. Make a pencil note on a heavily sized paper; use a fountain pen on 
unsized paper; write with a biro on an single ‘uncushioned’ sheet of copy paper atop a 
hardwood table; draw an energetic horizontal with a crisp italic on paper that is not 
hot-pressed; write with anything other than a waterproof pen on wax paper; draw on 
bible paper with a gushy pen and consider the verso; scribble small marks on laid 
paper with a fine-nibbed fountain pen; do a thick up-stroke with a sharp, pointed nib on 
any paper; take a crisp new sheet from a pad, halve it, leave one half on top of your 
desk, the other between the pages of a heavy book, after a week, write on both… 
 If such observations seem trivial and insubstantial then having and handling paper 
is trivial and insubstantial for the discussion of paper. Maryanne Dever reminds us that 
the intimate practice of dealing with paper, whether as an archivist or another 
practitioner engaged in paperwork ‘suggests how it may be paper’s emergent 
capacities – what it can do – more than its basic properties that we seek to hold onto’ 
(2014, p.290, italics in original). Though it is easy to reduce paper to mere pliant 
ground beneath each stroke and between all letters, paper as a base is perhaps even 
more basic, has even more fundamental properties for the marks on it.  
 
When it is not associated – like a leaf, moreover, or a silk paper – with a veil 
or canvas, writing’s blank white, spacing, gaps, the ‘blanks which become 
what is important,’ always open up onto a base of paper. Basically, paper 
often remains for us the basis of the basis, the base figure on the basis of 
which figures and letters are separated out. The indeterminate ‘base’ of paper, 
the basis of the basis en abyme, when it is also surface, support, and 
substance (hypokeimenon), material substratum, formless matter and force in 
force (dynamis), virtual or dynamic power of virtuality – see how it appeals to 
an interminable genealogy of these great philosophemes. (Derrida, 2005, 
p.53, italics in original) 
 
Derrida’s paper cannot be separated into paper as mere ground and the groundwork – 
that is: paperwork – supporting, authorising and legitimising power structures from 
bureaucracies to parliament and businesses to border controls. Paper is basic in the 
way that it is the base for writing, the potential of its force, the material sanctioning the 
acts inscribed on it and so on, en abyme. 
 
[T]his fundamental or basic chain of the ‘base’ (support, substratum, matter, 
virtuality, power) cannot possibly be dissociated, in what we call ‘paper,’ from 
the apparently antinomic chain of the act, the formality of ‘acts,’ and the force 
of law, which are all just as constitutive. (Derrida, 2005, p.54) 
 
Despite the active force of paper, Michael O’Driscoll points out that it ‘is also curiously 
self-abnegating […] as paper withdraws from view as the signs and markings 
command our focus’ (2006, p.224). This retreat of paper to become mere ground may 
however also be apparent in our own markings of it. Returning to the sheet long after 
having abandoned it, both writing and drawing adopt a solidity and plainness that they 
did not possess previously. As if the marks belonged to someone else or were never 
anything but the original scores of the paper, their clumsiness or elegance is still more 
anchored and less tentative. When the identification of marks is replaced by the faint 
recognition of their underlying gestures, both drawer and writer accept a blindness at 
their origin. A blindness that is also an acceptance that to (re)turn to the sheet is 
always a (re)turn to a sheet that was never blank, void or empty. It is a sheet that had 
been written on before, prescribed, and thus prescriptive for what was to come. It is 
prescriptive not only as a text that comes before the text, but a prescription, a 
normative grammar that directs and instructs, that marks the passage and maps the 
way. And, on the other hand, it is a prescription that is the script for the composition of 
a treatment, the treatment of a (pre)text, eine Vorschrift für eine Behandlung, a 
prescript(ion) for a particular kind of ‘handling’. At once, it is a text that calls upon feet 
and hands to carry on and carry out the script. 
 This sheet, like all others, has never been merely just white ground, open and 
acquiescent. As substrate, it is neither indifferent nor compliant. It is not open to 
receive all possible marks. It is neither neutral surface to be drawn upon, nor a skin or 
membrane that permits all inscriptions. Its surface as topography and matter as 
geology mediate the wandering pen. Topographically, it has dimensions that arbitrate 
its traversal. Crossing and composition happen within and without this space, 
negotiated by this space, in it and against it. The exploration of this space occurs 
within it and despite of it. To mark the sheet is also to react and act on and upon it. 
The paper’s size and ratio already anticipate its immanent and contingent composition. 
The sheet seems thereby to be landscape and map of itself at once (cf. Borges, 1998, 
p.325). It is traversed and provides the route of its traversal. The tip of the pencil 
encounters it in proximity, dragging its graphite heel, and yet the territory is also seen 
from above, overseen, surveilled at great distance and surveyed in its own map. It is 
walked upon and through, creating new paths and routes, which are also charting their 
own inscription. Marks and inscriptions – as if already pre-empted – are negotiated 
according to the paper’s topography. These marks themselves then become part of 
the landscape and its contingency, already anticipating future marks. Every crease, 
watermark and splotch is another furrow, bog and tarn navigated by composition, 
construction and wayfaring. In texture and fibre, paper finds its geology: terrain and 
stratification. Both confer how to access and travel the territory. 
 The weathered book cover and its hinged flyleaf greedily drink up brushed ink until 
saturated. Their surface resists the navigation of the nib, which scratches, stumbles, 
skips and often bleeds. Railroading tines cut into the paper, excavating short, friable 
fibres. They will draw up any liquid nearby, leading it into its channel, feathering its 
edge with a fringe. The surface seems to resist or subvert the pencil by emphasising 
its own texture. It becomes increasingly cratered and rugged. Only prolonged traversal 
levels it into an arid metallic trough. 
 On the other hand, like a terrene plain, the smooth hot-pressed sheet is deceptively 
easily crossed with any medium, yet, its traversal is seemingly inerasable, its surface 
so homogeneous that any trace appears infinitely visible. Its face is often so dense 
that it resists liquid which stays superficial, runs into pools, awaiting dispersion and 
evaporation, making it buckle.  
 On paper, ink from a nib appears liminal. It permeates, but sits on top; it is deeply 
anchored, but raises the surface. In inscribing itself, it engraves the groove that moors 
it and deposits itself in it and on it. It is both furrow and ridge. Is this seeming 
permanence its authority? In contrast, brushed ink seems subliminal. It penetrates and 
permeates. Its remains visible on the surface but cannot be felt. With pencil all 
depends on pressure. A fleeting step remains superliminal, it hardly engraves, smears 
graphene superficially. A heavy trudge troughs the paper, making it more than just 
surface, leaving a leaded furrow. Neither the written nor the drawn mark are two-
dimensional, flat traces on paper, rather they possess a volume and body that disturbs 
any notion of their modality as merely visible. 
 To recognise (this) paper therefore as shifting between submissive substrate and 
controlling dominium is to acknowledge it as one of the phenomena of Derrida’s 
subjectile (1994). A double, the subjectile is neither and both. It is, at once, a 
membrane whose subservient surface – mere ground – is energised by being acted 
upon, by being traversed, engraved, inscribed and penetrated. But it is also resolute 
resistance to the attempts to traverse it; it has to be tackled and its own characteristics 
assert themselves. It returns to a binary discourse, which wants to move beyond 
binarity, because the subjectile moves 
 
between the intransitivity of jacere and the transitivity of jacere, in what I will 
call the conjecture of both. In the first case, jaceo, I am stretched out, lying 
down, gisant, in my bed, brought down, brought low, without life, I am where I 
have been thrown […] thrown beneath. In the second case, jacio, I throw 
something, a projectile, thus, stones, a firebrand, seed (ejaculated), or dice – 
or I cast a line. […] because I have thrown something, I can have raised it or 
founded it. 
(Derrida, 1994, p.169, italics in original) 
 
 Without ever belonging to either, paper moves between active operative and 
acted/operated on. It is at once the available open ground walked upon, the potential 
for a path, the possibility of the spoor, that which expedites the step, bidding to be 
marked and traced. But it is also the resistance to every step, it defies exploration and 
impedes free traversal. While setting feet free, it also shackles them. If then, both the 
line of drawing and writing are inseparable from their papery support, what of the 
substrate? It is a substrate that is no longer sub-, beneath, that is no longer mere 
backing, but must be found to constitute what is, both as act and inscription. And if it is 
a stratum at all, a stratum super stratum, it is the merger of two homonymous verbs, 
not merely a blanket that is ‘spread out’ and ‘scattered’ over another ground but also 
the force that ‘knocks down’, ‘lays low’ and ‘overthrows’ (OED, 2016, s.v. stratum n.). 
And equally the implement, whose tip is bearer of a mark that it partly comes to 
compose, leaves itself behind in the mark, even when it itself has left. The graphite 
trace becomes the non-originary remainder of a gesture that itself continues to act. 
 The question of the interactions on the page returns to the hand whose traitement 
of the sheet opens the abyssal gap that reaches beyond alphabet and mimesis, 
beyond the verbal and pictural of chirography. It is in the (con)fluence of hand, 
implement and paper that the body and landscape of the graphic shape themselves. 
Through the hand, graphic traits are incurred in the prescribed composition of the 
treatment of the prescriptive (pre)text. It executes eine Behandlung that draws lines 
blind to the distinction of text and image.  
 Yet, to speak of one hand is to speak against the gesture of drawing and writing. 
Who draws with one hand? How can one hand write? Surely, one neither writes nor 
draws with a hand only. Initially, there is (often) another hand, the other hand (cf. 
Richtmeyer, 2012), which, though not marking the paper with an implement, still 
supports it and the drawer, accommodating the body of the drawer in the complex 
relation between substrate, implement and drawer. 
 The drawer does not merely hover ethereally above the substrate, but occupies an 
infinite number of possible spatial relations to the other material. Moreover, the many 
advantages of paper – flexibility, portability, malleability – also require it, in the words 
of Hana Gründler, Toni Hildebrandt and Wolfram Pichler, to ‘borrow another body’ that 
can prop it up, acquire it as detachable surface or skin (2012, p.17, author’s 
translation).  
 Even in a very narrow understanding of the idea of gesture, the hand or arm 
movement leading to a mark on paper, writing and drawing cannot be categorically 
distinguished. Neither writing nor drawing is limited to one particular position or grip of 
the pen or to one particular restricted form of muscular movement that guides it. 
Though writing may sustain a particular grip along the section longer, because 
repeated marks tend to be of more uniform size, the implements and what is to be 
written shape the way the pen is held and its movement across the page. Or 
conversely, the grip and movement co-determine how something may be written. 
Especially writing with ballpoints and other hard tools requires an exertion of pressure 
close to the writing surface in order to facilitate the flow or rasp of matter onto the 
page. The resultant wrist or even just fingertip movement usually brings with it a 
reduction in writing scale. This is however not to suggest that drawing necessarily 
involves more of the body. Muscular-movement writing, for example, requires the 
writer to use the arm’s musculature to guide the pen, often with wrist and forearm 
touching the writing surface and finger movement scorned upon. According to William 
Henning the method dates back to at least the Renaissance, though Ewan Clayton 
traces its origins to Joseph Carstairs in early nineteenth-century London (Henning, 
2002, p.296; Clayton, 1999, p.13 n.10, p.18; cf. Carstairs, 1816). Though we may now 
consider muscular writing as entirely atypical, it became a standard American writing 
technique in the early nineteenth century when it was subsequently adopted in the 
correspondence and business-writing manuals of Benjamin Foster, Platt Rogers 
Spencer and eventually Austin Palmer, whose popular simplified Spencerian explicitly 
required the writer to use the muscular action of a rigid arm ‘from the shoulder’ – with 
the little finger making contact with the writing surface – to achieve a light, untiring 
motion across the page (Palmer, 1894, p.5; cf. Foster, 1836; Spencer & Spencer, 
1868). 
 However, as Vilém Flusser observes in relation to the gesture of painting, we are 
used to dissecting the body of the artist and her gestures into separable body parts 
and aspects of movement, which are the parts and aspects that make the work 
(1994a, pp.88–9). (Though painting is not drawing or writing the comparison still holds 
as Flusser’s explanation does not hinge on the oft-evoked differences – use of colour, 
surface coverage, potential for spatial dimension etc – between the processes.) He 
further suggests that there is a metaphysical exclusivity underlying these aims to ‘fill’ 
gestures with body parts, as though the two existed separately. 
 
The first thing we must do, in order to see the gesture of painting, is to forgo 
the whole catalogue of bodies moving inside of gesture. Such a catalogue is 
‘metaphysical’, in the sense that it presupposes bodies which are somewhere 
outside the gesture and only later move within it. 
(Flusser, 1994a, p.88, author’s translation) 
 
The gesture is here irreducible to a body part, material or particular aspect of the 
movement. Flusser seeks the description and explanation for this kind of gesture in its 
directedness towards a final object: an object to come. Any explanation of the gesture 
that brings it about therefore needs to address all movements in relation to their future, 
even ‘the future of the gesture’ (Flusser, 1994a, p.90, author’s translation). 
Consequently, any attempt to describe the gesture at work should not be a 
conjunction of materials and creative subject synthesised into the work, but has to give 
up the division of material, support, maker, movement etc. Flusser’s phenomenology 
is above all interested in overcoming the predetermination of, what is for him typical of, 
occidental thought: abstraction and distance from concrete, observable experience. 
 
Were there a general gesture theory, a semiological discipline that would 
allow us to decipher gesture, art criticism would not be, as it is today, a thing 
of empiricism or ‘intuition’ or causal explaining-away of aesthetic phenomena, 
but an exact analysis of gestures frozen into paintings. Lacking such a 
‘choreographology’, it is perhaps a better strategy to observe the gesture 
itself, in the way it concretely occurs in front of us and thus in us: as an 
example of freedom. 
(Flusser, 1994a, p.99, author’s translation) 
 
 Of course, Flusser is perhaps the first to avoid exactly such a gesture analysis 
where it is urgently needed and particularly easily foregone. What speaks against a 
choreographologic conception of writing? For Flusser, the answer is at once self-
contradictory and straightforward: writing is typing. Writing by hand is for him too 
closely related to calligraphy and thus drawing. The availability of different writing 
implements (other than the typewriter) ‘speaks against the being of writing and recalls 
drawing’ (Flusser, 2002, p.116, author’s translation). The typewriter is his ideal writing 
instrument because it does not restrict the gesture of writing but makes the rules of the 
available material more obvious. If an ‘expressible virtuality’ finds its ‘expression’ in 
writing (rather than music or painting) it still encounters the resistance of its material: 
words (Flusser, 1994b, p.36, author’s translation). Writing is for Flusser a notation of 
speech that records terms not ideas. 
 Walter Benjamin had suggested that the typewriter may only replace the fountain 
pen were it to permit writers to engage directly and accurately with the conception of 
their books (1928, p.31). For Martin Heidegger similarly, the connection between word 
and hand was much more intimate. The typewriter constituted for him a breach 
between writing and the word, because the word was one of handwriting. Tearing the 
hand from writing, degraded the word itself in its reduction ‘to “typed stuff”’ (Heidegger, 
1994, p.119, author’s translation; cf. Leroi-Gourhan, 1993). As Derrida has indicated in 
relation to Heidegger’s indictment of the mechanisation of writing through the 
typewriter, handwriting ensured a closer relation to speech and the body, as well as 
gathering letters together, which was for Heidegger strongly linked to the gathering 
gesture of reading (lesen) (Derrida, 1987, pp.178–80). Friedrich Kittler, on the other 
hand, has sought to emphasise that the typewriter brought an end to the ‘metaphysics 
of handwriting’ that had animated centuries of written philosophy (Kittler, 1985b, p.25, 
author’s translation; cf. Stingelin, 1995; Günzel, 2002). While Michel Foucault 
acknowledges the material base of notation and the production, transmission and 
archivisation of knowledge, his analysis remains premised on the internal structures of 
discourse, returning to structural formations, types and genres (1972, pp.79–131). 
Kittler goes further: any notion of the construction of knowledge needs be considered 
not only in its situatedness in time and place but also as determined by medial 
contingencies that structure the mechanism of its formation, retention and 
dissemination (Kittler, 1985a, 1986). The typewriter is only one of a number of 
technological changes (phonography, photography, cinematography) that 
fundamentally reorient notions of referentiality and the understanding of the written 
signifier. 
Interestingly, Flusser also recognises the idea of gathering in the act of reading 
(lesen), though his gathering has the deliberation and selectivity of collecting, which 
allows him to read for particular recognisable characteristics of writing (2002, p.77). 
Flusser’s gesture of writing is thus already removed from any necessary graphic 
qualities of the written word – not to mention the letter – and more concerned with the 
combinatorics of clearly defined and limited significatory units. A choreographology of 
writing’s gesture would merely encounter the verbality of words that is already 
separate from their plastic, i.e. written, instantiation. Given the aforementioned 
insistence of the danger of ‘explaining away’ actual phenomena, Flusser’s logocentric 
– and Lessing-inspired – perspective is doubly puzzling. On the one hand, he 
deliberately seems to avoid the observational analysis of gesture as he encourages it 
elsewhere, on the other, he foregrounds physical, material and environmental aspects 
of (type)writing. For example, he part-bemoans and part-endorses that literary criticism 
is only interested in ‘das Himmlische, nicht das Irdische’ of writing. Its interest is in ‘the 
heavenly, not the earthly’, which carries the ambiguous connotations of ‘the 
transcendental, not the physical’ and ‘the elevated, not the profane’ (Flusser, 2002, 
p.125, author’s translation). But then he adds that, though the writer is more than 
fingertips, his body has no place to be mentioned, except in extreme cases, like the 
writing in Gulags. He is demanding the context of the gesture of writing to be taken 
into account, a context whose physicality, however, he rescinds. Finally perhaps, 
much of Flusser’s writing on writing often reads like a love letter to a typewriter whose 
shortcomings he has come to adore and require. In relation to the advent of 
computers on desks, he wonders if we perhaps need the dumb equipment of the past, 
in contrast to the unencumbered writing of the future, in order to be able to write 
(Flusser, 2002, pp.125–6). 
 As Franklin’s absurd paper people are more concerned with paper type rather than 
character, so Flusser is more concerned with the type-ical of writing rather than its 
characteristics. Not only does he prefer to recognise writing in type, but writing as 
‘printed matter is a typical matter and not a characteristic, incomparable, unique one’ 
(Flusser, 2002, p.52, author’s translation). Writing for Flusser, like paper for Franklin 
and others, are interchangeable types that are devoid of idiosyncratic characteristics. 
The body of paper and the body of writing follow clear typologies. The former is flat, 
blank and open to any mark, its characteristics are background to the inscriptions they 
serve. The latter is clearly defined and limited; its transparent body appears 
indistinguishable from its verbality and signification.  
 
Paper blind 
A consideration of the gesture and material of writing and drawing thus seemingly 
extends the understanding of the substrate in action and moves beyond the manual – 
and with it beyond any maniera – to evaluate the corporeality of the drawer-writer as 
only one of the acting subjects. The materials and subjects of writing and drawing 
exceed narrowly operational parameters, instead engaging the environmental and 
corporeal of both drawer and writer, and drawing and writing. As Gründler, Hildebrandt 
and Pichler stress: ‘No drawing is made by a human hand alone, but always includes 
the surface of the substrate and often also the invisible counter-support that was 
removed after the drawing process’ (2012, p.18, author’s translation). And yet again, 
whilst recognising and requiring the invisible support, we will continue to speak of 
someone’s writing hand and seek the hand in the drawing and the drawing in the 
hand, in the ‘reciprocal relationship of hand and graphy’ (Gründler et al., 2012, p.6, 
author’s translation). So, what is the point of such bradylexic creeping across the 
landscape and body of writing and drawing? Is this the pendulum swinging the other 
way, away from a generalised notion of the materiality of paper to one that indulges in 
the idiosyncratic detail of every single sheet, microscopically questioning every 
perceivable and imaginable characteristic of highly individualised substances? Or 
differently, is this a shift toward an inability to see the paper for its piddling minutiae? 
Propositionally and to intercept any quick responses, perhaps there is something to be 
gained in the kind of writing about art, pictures, images, visual perception and, above 
all, the practice of drawing and writing, that is highly vigilant in the observance of the 
materials and bodies involved. Though art-history, critical-theory and visual-culture 
discourses profess a deep-seated interest in the material, James Elkins still asserts 
that they are fearful and superficial in the manner in which they engage with it. He 
identifies three problems in particular: ‘the fear of materiality and the slowness of the 
studio’, as well as a broader issue, touching on the two others, ‘the limit of 
phenomenological detail’ (2008, p.26, original emphasis omitted). The first problem is 
grounded in a perceived incompatibility between close physical encounter with an 
object and its contextual framing (historical, theoretical, social etc.), as well as the 
potential derogation, vis-à-vis class consciousness, of what may be perceived as the 
detritus of manual labour. Secondly, the interaction and engagement with bodies, 
materials and gestures is inherently slow in comparison to cogitation that eschews 
them. And finally, though phenomenology provides perhaps the best possibility for an 
affective/effective attempt to come to terms with the experience of things, its scope 
within discourse remains questionable.  
 In the indexical gesture of the graphic mark, both drawer and writer scrutinise the 
landscape and body on the ground. Examining it thoroughly and closely as if by touch, 
they also survey it from the distance as a correlated map that constantly changes as a 
new path is drawn by the graphite-footed prowling on its territory. This shift between 
proximity and distance also reiterates the blindnesses of the drawer. The pen’s eye – 
the wayfarer’s boot – obscures the vision of the drawer. As pen and boot traverse, 
they persistently blind the one spot of crucial importance. They always shadow the 
spot that they – in that moment – inscribe and describe. By necessity, the surveyor’s 
inscription blinds the surveyor in the moment of inscription. 
 But the pen’s shadow and body are not the only impediments to seeing drawing. 
Derrida differentiates three types of blindness in view of drawing. Firstly, he remarks 
on ‘the aperspective of the graphic act’, the umbrage given by the implement and the 
gap traced by the trait, which ‘must proceed in the night’ and which is at once said to 
be a stand-in – mimetic or representative – for the figure but does not form part of the 
figure’s ‘spectacle’ (1993, pp.44–5, italics in original). Again, doubly so, the trait is 
tracing itself before it shows and sees itself, but also shares no aspect of the figure it 
apparently traces through itself. And the one who draws, doubly blind to the drawing 
and the figure, can only see the one or the other: marking the impossibility not only of 
the trace – the trace of what?: the trace of that which is not seen or the unseen trace – 
but also of tracing – tracing what?: tracing what is not there. Deanna Petherbridge’s 
observation that the ‘[l]ine is a representational convention’ that does not find a match 
‘in the observable world’, chimes with Derrida’s, though she approaches drawing’s 
trace quite differently (2010, p.90). Derrida invokes the night a second time to 
characterise the gap between the figure and the stroke that traces it, noting that ‘[t]he 
heterogeneity between the thing drawn and the drawing trait remains abyssal’ (1993, 
p.45). The nocturnal depth of this abyss returns to the immeasurable distance and 
infinite proximity between what drawing sees and shows. Drawing is a process that 
happens on paper but is not limitable to it. The gesture of drawing begins prior to and 
continues beyond the graphic mark on the page though the force and affect of that 
mark are testament to the act beyond itself. As Derrida describes anecdotally, writing 
may similarly proceed blindly. When waking in the night or driving a car, we may write 
with eyes wide open in complete darkness or looking elsewhere. As in the drawing 
act, the ‘hand of the blind [writer] ventures forth alone or disconnected, in a poorly 
delimited space; it feels its way, it gropes, it caresses as much as it inscribes, trusting 
in the memory of signs and supplementing sight’ (Derrida, 1993, p.3). Writing is guided 
by the pen’s ferrule reading the paper’s surface and the hand's rehearsed response to 
the touch of the page. 
 And yet the nocturnal tides all drawing not just the one called figurative. The 
pleasure in drawing, which is the same as its pain, is its lateral procession at night. 
Drawing as a process aims to determine its own indeterminacy and, as artefact, 
presents its indeterminate determination. To draw is to eliminate, stroke by stroke, 
many drawings in order to arrive at one, not one previously determined, but one that in 
its drawing drew itself out of infinitely many. And as each confident slick and probing 
dash erases another drawing, the one that reluctantly urges ahead knows not itself but 
negotiates itself in every mark, especially those it does not make but which are still 
made and constitute it in return. It is precisely here then that the gesture neither fills 
the body nor imposes itself on a substrate, for without body and material there would 
be no such gesture. There would be no such strokes without the confluence of bodies, 
no such confluence of bodies without the gesture. In this erasure of drawings, drawing, 
as process, draws itself forth in order to draw itself out as consequence. It is a 
consequence of strokes that neither intended it, nor are reducible to it. Drawing’s 
necessary inseparability from its background shows itself in the void space that is not 
void, that is just as drawn as the drawn space without carrying the pen’s marks. Its 
marks are gestures of an implement that draws undrawingly.  
 Nevertheless the intention of drawing remains, although it is not one that is ever 
fulfilled. Nanne Meyer describes the beginning of her drawings as guided by a ‘more 
or less clear intention [Ab-Sicht], which may be imageless, a specific kind of 
premonition, a something, which I can drawingly push off from’ (2012, p.141, author’s 
translation and italics). The specific vocabulary, hyphenation and capitalisation are 
insightful here. Absicht, the commonplace German for the intention, purpose, aim or 
design, becomes a scopic intent, a fore-sight or fore-seeing that in translation cycles 
etymologically through the nightly depth that the obsolete fore-wit has to offer, from 
wit’s wissen, to know, to vidēre, to see; and thus perhaps properly ‘I have seen, 
hence, I know’ (wát , wást , witon) (OED, 2016, s.v. wit v.1). Notwithstanding, this fore-
wit is without image, a vision that does not see. The scope of its intent feels its way 
nocturnally through the strictures of drawing. It opens up drawing despite and because 
of the ‘blank’ page, against it and through it (Newman & de Zegher, 2003, pp.234–6). 
Drawing’s frictions, offered and arising through the materials, supports and bodies in 
action, propel drawing in itself from its intent. Drawing pushes against intent, paper, 
graphite stick and self to arrive at itself. However, this pushing off from or pushing 
against is not a contrarian push, not a push that intends to overthrow the other. As in 
the prefix ab-, common to Ab-Sicht and abstossen, this push is but a frictional desire 
of facing another, of rubbing against another, an attrition arising in attraction that gives 
rise because and despite of the drawer’s intention. In this push against and within 
paper, representation, intention and gesture we however also recognise Derrida’s 
push of language against silence. It is similarly a push ‘against’ an opposition and 
adversary who is also a counterpart and ground on which to stand. It provides the 
support and friction that propels the mark (visual, verbal, phonic). 
 
[S]ilence plays the irreducible role of that which bears and haunts language, 
outside and against which alone language can emerge – ‘against’ here 
simultaneously designating the content from which form takes off by force, 
and the adversary against whom I assure and reassure myself by force. 
(Derrida, 2001, pp.65–6, italics in original) 
 
To disturb the notion of ‘against’ as merely antagonistic by demonstrating its 
supplementation and dependency on what it pushes off from is particularly meaningful 
because it addresses both material and medial aspects of drawing and writing 
practices. The art school bromide of ‘working against the material’ is here a point in 
case because it suggests an opposition to something that is not oppositional. If we 
take Ingold’s assertion of material flux and transformation seriously (2007b), then 
there is nothing that can be done to matter that is not already a potential within the 
material itself. Burning a sheet of paper does not work against the material but shows 
it as combustible. This idea extends similarly to the contention of working against a 
certain medium. Gottfried Boehm argues ‘[t]hat a particular group of artists do not 
optimise media according to their immanent logic, but work against the grain, using 
them inversely’ (2004, p.109, italics in original, author’s translation). Exemplarising Cy 
Twombly’s and Stéphane Mallarmé’s work, he notes that the former moves the trace 
of painting from its identifiable sphere into one of uncertainty, as well as releasing 
writing from the ‘logic of succession’, while the latter shows writing’s material 
characteristics (Boehm, 2004, p.112, italics in original, author’s translation). Boehm 
asserts that particular artists inverse medial uses in order to expose and explore the 
rules governing them. This argumentation, though entirely plausible, is however also 
tautological. If the ‘immanent logic’ of a medium or practice can be inverted, this 
inversion is already part of the ‘immanent logic’ and thus not its inversion. The paradox 
returns to the assumption that there may be an optimal use of a medium, one that 
works optimally by not working against its grain. Consequently, the notion of ‘working 
against’ shows itself as the incapacity of a category to describe its own object. The 
importance of the substrate or the affect and power of handwriting are only marginal or 
‘parasitic’ in a closed system of writing that is a priori a phonocentric, auxiliary, 
secondary, representative combinatorics of speech and which thus considers ‘the 
body of the written trace as a didactic and technical metaphor, as servile matter or 
excrement’ (Derrida, 1988, p.16, 2001, p.248). 
 However, in the use of Derrida and Meyer materials are not optimally shaped into a 
preconceived notion of a medium or practice. Rather, material and gesture are 
constitutive of medial effects. The form of drawing does not arrive preformed, does not 
replicate that which is (not) there or that which is (not) imagined. In Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
words, ‘[d]rawing is the opening [l’ouverture] of form’, inseparable from its ‘[m]atter’, 
which 
 
is the name of form’s resistance to its deformation. It is not a formless 
‘content’ that form comes to mold or model but rather the thickness, texture, 
and force of form itself. 
(2013, pp.1, 7) 
 
Properly, as David Espinet reminds us, ‘“l’ouverture”’ needs to be read multiply as 
well: drawing as the beginning of form, the ‘opening’ of the possibility of form but also 
drawing’s ‘persistent openness’ which is never comprehensive or complete, always 
unclosably undetermined (2012, p.168, italics in original, author’s translation; cf. 
Meskimmon & Sawdon, 2016). What (form) drawing shows is thus neither reducible to 
some referential thing, nor to the ideal of that thing, instead, it is the idea (ideated not 
ideal) of the thing offered as a (trans)formation in its unique and determinate stricture 
as drawing. Does that sound too much like hedging or tautology? If so, then the 
options Nancy offers are stark: on the one hand, an account – often art historical – that 
determines drawing as fixed information, drawing as note taking, its sensing, limited to 
sensory capacities, merely ‘the simple perception of data’; on the other hand, drawing 
is persistently in formation, it also ‘notes’ but only to enable a sensing that ‘exhausts 
and exceeds’ ‘sensoriality or sensibility’, ‘sensing, [as] a faculty of making sense, or of 
letting it be formed’ (2013, p.21, italics in original). Hence, drawing as the opening of 
form, requires a differentiation between drawing as immanent, formative force, a will to 
form (Formungswille), a form-generative momentum, and drawing as fully formed, 
settled and complete object, sensed retrospectively as a modality of the image: forma 
formans as opposed to forma formata (Nancy, 2013, p.21; cf. Espinet, 2012, pp.169–
70; Meyer, 2012, pp.138–9. Hildebrandt, 2014, pp.48–9). For Nancy, the pleasure in 
drawing arises exactly in the persistent nascence that invents, forms, makes up, 
makes sense and in-forms. Drawing does not come to rest in a papery coffin, rather it 
continuous to unsettle itself in and beyond the paper, uncontainable by any gaze that 
aims to arrest it, on paper but not of it, determined but not determinable. 
 If the nocturnal advance of drawing and seeing drawing describes the first of 
Derrida’s aspects of the powerlessness of the eye, then the second is named ‘the 
withdrawal (retrait) or the eclipse, the differential inappearance of the trait’ (1993, p.53, 
italics in original). Derrida asks, once the tracing of the trait has occurred, what is this 
trait? It describes what is not there, an outline that demarcates the line outside no 
thing, it is situated between inside and outside of the figure. And even as it relates to 
itself, as a re-trait of a trait, it divides itself, disrupting (in its divisibility) all identification 
of itself: 
 
[O]nly the surroundings of the trait appear – that which the trait spaces by 
delimiting and which thus does not belong to the trait. Nothing belongs to the 
trait, and thus, to drawing and to the thought of drawing, not even its own 
‘trace.’ 
(1993, p.54, italics in original) 
 
The withdrawal of the trait (le retrait du trait) is a retreat that accompanies the 
recognition of its mark as the limitation of the spaces that it inscribes. The trait is never 
itself, but the difference between spaces marked outside themselves. Drawing and 
seeing drawing become subject to ‘the law of the inter-view’, it draws the spaces 
between the lines together , ‘a jalousie (a blind) of traits cutting up the horizon’ 
(Derrida, 1993, p.55, italics in original). This kind of drawing circumscribes an 
interlinear vision that differs and defers from its own traits. Its spaces are not marked 
and its constituent marks do not inscribe themselves. Drawing hovers and shimmers 
between the marks it makes and the spaces it leaves unmarked. Or differently, as 
James Elkins reads it, to consider an individual mark of a drawing detaches it from the 
rest of the picture. The mark will sink into the surface it marks and its own edges will 
take on the force and potential of marks themselves, until ‘that half-imaginary mark will 
begin to “wear itself out”’ and so on (Elkins, 1995, p.837, italics in original; cf. Derrida, 
1993, p.53). This same process of repetitive and ever-recursive deferral and difference 
again recognises the drawing of the blind. 
 As a potential effect of the withdrawal of the trait, Derrida notes ‘the third aspect [of 
drawing’s blindness]: the rhetoric of the trait’ (1993, p.56, italics in original). The 
cession of the trait sees the emergence of the discursive, for Derrida provocatively 
poses the possibility that the imperialist rule of rhetoric over images is granted, rather 
than imposed, by the retreat, deferral and diffraction of the line that marks drawing. 
Though Elkins argues that ‘Derrida’s is a repressive reading’ (1995, p.838), what 
comes into view throughout is Derrida’s profound reluctance to delimit drawing and the 
viewing of drawing verbally. In fact, the scope of Derrida’s blindness is circumscribed 
by what can be seen and said with certainty about drawing. Both Derrida’s and Elkins’ 
projects, albeit in different ways, seem to recognise the potential usurption of drawing 
by vision and words. Derrida, in considering the blindness of drawing, hence speaks of 
the powerlessness of the eye, not as an insufficiency but to mark ‘the experience of 
drawing [as a] quasi-transcendental resource’ (1993, p.44, italics in original). The 
power of drawing arises here in the eye’s powerlessness to see drawing. A blindness 
that requires the blind to return to the drawing again and again, in order to see and be 
blind again, to see differently and yet still be unable to see totally.  
 Regarding the written mark, we noted that it averts exclusively pointing at its 
substrate, while the drawn one, on the other hand, cannot be entirely detached from it. 
Even when drawing seemingly approaches the transparency of writing, for example in 
architectural plans, typographic designs, medical illustrations etc. (cf. Voorhoeve, 
2011; Lyotard, 2011, pp.195–6, 206), its line also always belongs to paper, though it 
never absolutely belongs to anything, not even itself. Drawing’s line traces a boundary 
that cannot absolutely exclude its paper, whereas writing cannot entirely include it. 
The phrasing may be reversed to show that writing also occurs on a substrate and 
drawing in a space illimitable to one singular sheet, though that is not to say that the 
result of the reversal makes the two practices the same. Rather, while writing can 
never truly belong to the paper and drawing never truly be separated from it, their 
shared graphic traits ensure that the vacillation cannot be arrested. 
 The way that writing as script, i.e. writing as graphic marks on paper, needs to be 
turned into language and (inner) speech may be exemplified through Klaus Weimar’s 
contention that reading is a ‘languaging [Versprachlichen] of writing on the one hand 
and the perception of speech [Sprache] on the other, though not in alternation but 
indivisibly at once’ (1999, p.50, italics in original, author’s translation). The German 
language permits Weimar to funambulate on the line of Sprache as language, as a 
shared and codified structure of linguistic patterns (langue), in the widest sense even 
human speech (langage) and speech as a use of language in an individual utterance 
(parole) (cf. de Saussure, 1966, pp.9–10, 13). His assertion therefore cannot avoid 
seeking to designate reading as also a ‘speechifying of writing’ with its concomitant 
‘perception of language’, as well as the all the other remaining combinations (cf. 
Renner, 2010, p.46). What is remarkable about this analysis in any case is that writing 
is not perceived as language, rather that the reader needs to turn it into language 
and/or inner speech. This inner speech itself, as Hans Lösener has indicated, is in a 
precarious position between language and non-language, too, because by definition it 
does not speak (its sound is not heard) but only rehearses a phoneme (its sound is 
perceived) silently (2006, p.49). ‘Reading means to speak to oneself in another’s 
name based on writing’ (Weimar, 1999, p.56, italics in original, author’s translation), 
which makes the reader both sender and receiver of an impossible translation based 
on written marks. There is thus no simple and self-evident automatism, mechanism or 
process that absolutely prescribes and limits how writing is encountered and read (cf. 
though Weimar, 1999, p.59). Why, however, would this reading be dissociable from 
the material constituents of writing? Even outside of the visual arts and in the most 
trivial senses we recognise the importance of particular physical characteristics of 
writing. The proposition to hand out university degrees scribbled with a biro on the 
back of a fag packet or as a virtual-paper PDFs does not offend because the former is 
defiled and the latter potentially fraudulent, but because the acts of writing are 
illimitable to a transcendent understanding of text. Writing’s power issues as 
paperwork and paper’s work. As the use of words and phrases is culturally, politically, 
socially, contextually, personally etc. encoded and shifting, so the co-importance of 
material actors needs to be called upon to explore why a word-identical condolence 
message sent via letter or WhatsApp can be read very differently. Conversely, the 
assumption that drawing is intimately bound to its singular sheet of paper appears 
overdrawn for it is quite imaginable that the subsequent one in the pad would have 
permitted a drawing whose difference is perceivable only in the sense of Nelson 
Goodman’s distinction between the perfect forgery and the original, that is to say, we 
cannot discriminate between the two works now but we may in the future (1976, 
pp.105–6). 
 Derrida comments that there are arbitrary conventions of discourse – 
oppositionality, presence, genre etc – which are merely self-instituting 
and -legitimising, and arrive at the cost of the marginalisation of other phenomena. 
Instead, he suggests, it is necessary to consider the impact of temporal and material 
factors on the economy of writing. Of course, this will disturb the existing graphematic 
and structural constraints. 
 
Are we now going to integrate such fringes into the text, and take account of 
such frames? Are all these parasites to be incorporated into the economy of 
discourse? Must the surface of the paper, the contents of the time at our 
disposal, etc. all be integrated into our calculations? If so, what about the ink 
remaining in my typewriter ribbon? And yet: why not? That is the question. 
(1988, p.45) 
 
Moreover, the analysis of writing’s signifiers will also need to include the gesture of 
writing. ‘As concerns the forms of signs, even within phonetic writing, the cathexes of 
gestures, and of movements, of letters, lines, points, the elements of the writing 
apparatus (instrument, surface, substance, etc.)’ these are elements of a 
understanding of writing that does not arbitrarily include some graphic aspects while 
designating others as parasites or excrement (Derrida, 2001, p.290). 
 Conversely for drawing, which may just as easily be subsumed into a blind 
materialism as into a legible text constituted by transparent signifiers. It, too, is held in 
the abeyance of a mark that is also a gesture and material, whilst being and making 
visible. Elkins similarly supports the suspense of drawing in avoiding the reduction of it 
into either image or material: 
 
Marks blur and fade into one another, and even the freshest drawing will have 
uncertain moments where the texture of the paper confounds the sense of a 
mark, or a group of marks converge into a dark confusion, or a mark moves 
so lightly across the page that it is not securely visible. No image is composed 
in any other way. 
What is a figure? A faint webbing of paper fibers and remnants of chalk; a 
morass of sticky oil. 
(1995, p.834, cf. 1999) 
 
 At least for writing, there now exists a growing amount of cognitive-psychological 
research that demonstrates how different technologies and materials impact the 
intellectual capacity of its users. For example, it has been shown that students taking 
lecture notes longhand have equally good factual recall as those typing along on a 
computer (Mueller & Oppenheimer, 2014). However, the handwriters outperformed the 
typerwriters in conceptual questions even when other computer-based distractions 
were eliminated. One of the assumptions is that increased ease of note-taking does 
not facilitate the reformulation and processing of information required for the slower 
longhand writing (cf. Mueller & Oppenheimer, 2016). In fact, ‘disfluency’, reduced 
transcription fluency, has been shown to result in enhanced lexical sophistication, 
sentence complexity and cohesion of the writing, when the essays of skilled 
typewriters composing with both hands were compared to their one-handed efforts 
(Medimorec & Risko, 2016; Medimorec, Young, & Risko, 2017). Though the results 
are reversed when longhand writers are asked to write in an unfamiliar calligraphy, 
which also resulted in a less fluent writing process (Olive, Alves, & Castro, 2009). 
Similarly, the interrelations between ‘better’ handwriting and reading proficiency have 
been experimentally tested and confirmed (Gimenez et al., 2014). The exact 
disentaglement of temporal, material, gestural etc factors shall not interest us here, 
what is however important are that ergonomics, ‘material affordances and 
sensorimotor contingencies’ are of demonstrable importance to our intellectual history 
(Mangen & Balsvik, 2016, p.99). 
 Writing and drawing are gestural practices that rely on material and technological 
interactions which are not neutral to their intellectual and affective force. Neither paper 
nor instruments are inert tools but active constituents of our intellectual development. 
The separation of sensory matter and cognitive effect may not be erased but its 
continuous displacement towards a more integrated approach is required in order to 
account for the encounters with and practices of writing and drawing. In order to 
continue Foucault’s, Flusser’s, Kittler’s and others’ attentive project regarding the 
interactions of our material and cognitive life, we will need to think them further even if 
it uncomfortably expands the arbitrary limitations we have already imposed. 
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